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Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia has become an obligatory talking point in 
discussion of the two countries’ relations. Western media is full of predictions about the 
eventual erosion of Georgia’s pro-Western consensus, torpedoed by a coalition of pro-
Eurasian NGOs, the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), and groups of Russia 
sympathizers within the elite. The alleged growth of Russian influence is paralleled by 
assumptions of Western inaction; observers argue that the West is unlikely to ever 
“meaningfully” support Georgia against serious Russian exploits. In Georgia, however, 
there is a more skeptical view about Russian soft power. Ultimately, Russia’s influence is 
limited; it is channeled through similarities in the countries’ conservative and religious 
sociocultural agendas, as well as the political pragmatism of certain domestic forces. 
 
The Logic of Russian Soft Power in Georgia   
 
Russia’s policy toward Georgia has a few different foundations. Generally, Moscow 
claims a special role toward conflict-ridden states of the “near abroad” like Georgia. This 
is not only due to its status as legal successor to the Soviet Union but also its 
peacekeeping role in the early 1990s, when no international organization was ready or 
willing to provide an alternative. Arguably, Russia’s peacemaking efforts were not 
entirely specious. In 1997, Yevgeny Primakov acted as a mediator between Abkhaz 
secessionist leader Vladislav Ardzinba and then-Georgian president Eduard 
Shevardnadze, even obtaining consent from Ardzinba to reunite in a single state with 
Georgia. According to Primakov, the deal failed because Shevardnadze insisted on a 
unitary state, which was unacceptable to the Abkhaz. Until 2008, Moscow even 
sanctioned Abkhazia for separatism, at least formally. The Kremlin also played a key 
role in removing Aslan Abashidze, the head of the autonomous republic of Adjara, from 
power, after he clashed with then-president Mikheil Saakashvili in 2004.  
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Russian policy toward Georgia draws on other reasoning as well. Geopolitical realists 
perceive the actions of a classic hegemon, motivated by the desire to impose control over 
the volatile Caucasus. Normative crusaders (for example, Leonid Kalashnikov, a 
member of the Russian parliament’s foreign relations committee) claim that Russia does 
not have any material interest in supporting Abkhazia and South Ossetia against 
Georgia, and only does so out of a sense of justice.  
 
What both viewpoints share is the idea that Georgia’s EU Association Agreement 
(signed in 2014) is just another sign of Russia’s further marginalization in Europe. 
Indeed, Georgia—along with Ukraine and Moldova—has achieved much more in 
practical terms in its relations with Brussels than has Russia. The possibility that Georgia 
will stake out a faster path to Europeanization than Russia is a strong irritant for its 
ruling elite. 
 
Russia never managed to transform its arguments into a consistent narrative that 
Georgians could find appealing. Moscow tends to deny the possibility that Georgians 
might genuinely desire integration with the West, instead claiming that the United 
States just manipulates Georgia in that direction. Georgian observers view this policy as 
irrational and self-defeating. Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after 
the August 2008 war only diminished its leverage over Tbilisi.  
 
Russia’s Potential Levers 
 
How does Russia try to sway Georgia? There are a number of segments of the Georgian 
political community that are open and susceptible to Russian influence. But how well 
are Moscow’s efforts working?   
 
1) Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 
The most challenging issue concerns the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 
the one hand, Russia refuses to acknowledge itself as a party to the conflicts and 
regularly calls on Tbilisi to negotiate directly with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. On the 
other hand, Russia has sought to retain full control over any dialogue and insists that 
Georgia forget about its “overseas partners” as mediators and deal exclusively with 
Moscow.  
 
In practical terms, Russia’s approach implies that a resolution to the conflicts is 
hypothetically possible but at a price too high for Georgia to seriously consider. Despite 
Russia’s insistence on recognizing the breakaway territories as independent states, 
Russia’s deputy foreign minister Georgi Karasin has said that “the crucial thing is to 
convince Abkhazians and South Ossetians that they would be better off living in a 
confederation with Georgia as opposed to living on their own. Should this be attained, 
this would be an absolutely new political situation.” Vladimir Putin has himself made 
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similar statements. But Russia would most likely want Georgia’s membership in the 
Eurasian Economic Union in return, an option that is unacceptable to Tbilisi. 
 
2) Two Brotherly Churches 
 
A second potential avenue for Russian influence is religious diplomacy. The Russian 
Orthodox Church (ROC) supports the integrity of the canonical territory of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church (GOC), mostly as a way to retain influence but also to have the GOC 
on its side when it comes to tricky “policy” controversies like Orthodox church issues in 
Ukraine or property holdings in Estonia. In contrast to the Kremlin, the ROC—at least in 
words—prioritizes good relations with Georgia over relations with Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  
 
At the same time, Russian religious diplomacy revolves around a conservative agenda 
that has a geopolitical edge. The LGBT issue is a case in point that stands as a proxy for 
swaying Georgia away from the West. Many Georgian observers suspect that the 
Russian leadership is consciously manipulating Orthodox values in an effort to do so.  
 
Admittedly, the GOC is a controversial institution in its own right. It supports European 
integration but also exhibits Stalinist sympathies. Georgian Patriarch Ilya II is critical of 
Russia’s policy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia but he has also met—surprisingly for 
many—with the “Night Wolves,” the pro-Kremlin Russian biker group.   
 
The question is whether GOC sympathies that coincide with Russian positions are a 
product of soft power or stem from the ideological convergence of two kindred 
churches. Georgian priests refer to Russian spiritual teachers and copy many ROC 
procedures, while Patriarch Ilya II has praised Putin as a “very wise [person who] will 
do everything to ensure that Russia and Georgia will be brothers once again.“ But there 
is also little evidence of direct ROC outreach in Georgia, except for the sporadic 
sponsoring of religious youth camps and some theological university contacts.    
 
Indeed, the GOC has made numerous efforts to distance itself from the ROC. Its leaders 
have issued prominent pro-Western statements. There were no ROC representatives at 
Patriarch Ilya’s 30th enthronement anniversary. GOC priests have mentioned in 
interviews the ROC’s de facto support of the Kremlin’s campaign to deport Georgian 
labor migrants in 2006. The GOC did not side with Moscow on Russian policy in 
Ukraine. In 2015, Georgian Metropolitan Nikolay of Ahalkalaki and Kumurdoi 
suggested that “what happen[ed] in Ukraine is close to us: in 1993 we went through 
pretty much the same. In an Abkhazian village a monk was killed, who never took arms 
in his hands, only because he represented the GOC.” 
 
Despite the ROC’s recognition of Georgia’s canonical territory, the GOC has expressed 
some skepticism. In 2015, Georgian Archbishop Andrian Gvazava addressed UNESCO 
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with a request to monitor churches and monasteries in regions beyond the Georgian 
government’s control. Earlier, in 2013, the GOC issued a statement accusing the ROC of 
sanctifying newly-built Orthodox churches in the Abkhazian towns of Sukhumi and 
Tkvarcheli.  
 
3) Russo-Georgia Advocates 
 
Some think tanks and foundations also serve as channels of communication between 
Russia and Georgia. The Caucasian Dialogue program, which is co-managed by the 
Caucasian House and the Gorchakov Foundation, is the best example. These efforts stem 
from an assumption that Russia’s use of hard power against Georgia is a response to 
Tbilisi’s anti-Russian policy. They float the notion that Georgia could regain lost 
territories if it refrains from unduly irritating the Kremlin. In their vision, Eurasia is a 
rising region that is not confined to Russia alone, while Georgia’s European choice is 
nothing more than a utopian “bright future.” Russia’s disapproval of the former 
Saakashvili government is an important aspect of their narrative. With him gone, they 
say, Georgia can have “business-as-usual” relations with Moscow; that Russia is no 
longer a major threat. They also say that Russia actually needs a “pro-Georgian” elite in 
Tbilisi (driven by Georgian interests) that would be ready to cooperate with the Eurasian 
Union or serve as a bridge between Russia and the EU.  
 
Some of these groups’ discourses are quite sophisticated. For example, the Caucasian 
House turns on its head the conventional sentiment that Russian pressure on Georgia 
and Ukraine helped consolidate pro-Western constituencies. Instead, it has negatively 
reconceptualized the parallel between Georgia and Ukraine, finding similarities between 
Saakashvili and Ukraine’s president Petro Poroshenko as two pro-Western presidents 
who have done harm to their countries. 
 
4) Pro-Eurasian Advocates 
 
Some Georgian NGOs advocate for Georgia’s full integration into Eurasian projects. 
Two examples are the “Society of Irakly II” and “Eurasian Choice-Georgia.” Both groups 
are in contact with proponents of the “Russian World” and of Eurasianist versions of 
Russian neoimperialism. These groups believe that Georgia has a “natural” dependence 
on Russia, and they argue that a majority of Georgians sympathize with Russia in 
contrast to a minority that is “controlled” by the West.  
 
The Limits to Russian “Soft Power”  
 
While the above might be avenues for Russia to use “soft power” in Georgia, two 
caveats apply. The first is that Russian soft power is symbiotic with hard power. For 
instance, Russia’s shift of the demarcation line between Georgia and South Ossetia two 
kilometers further into Georgian territory in July 2015 provoked a strong public outburst 
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in Georgia, radicalized public opinion, and complicated the work of Georgian experts 
open to dialogue with Russia. Russia invests efforts and resources into fostering a 
positive image in Georgia, but these kinds of occurrences reinforce widespread fears that 
Russia can suddenly use force against Georgia at any time. 
 
Second, many in Georgia understand the very concept of “soft power” to be an imperial 
notion of Western origin that implies a pervasive form of control backed by material 
factors. This perception leads Georgians to view Russia as merely taking advantage of 
domestic debates while seeking to capitalize on the reluctance of the West to confront 
Moscow. 
 
In the end, Russian soft power in Georgia cannot counter-balance European projects, 
which are far wider in scope and more professional in implementation. Russia mainly 
works with a Georgian clientele that is already “tacitly” pro-Russian. These include 
Eurosceptics who already believe Georgia will never be accepted by the EU or NATO; 
advocates for self-submission to Russian-led neo-imperial projects; pro-Stalinist groups 
nostalgic for Soviet times; and Orthodox traditionalists. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Russian soft power is, above all, a security tool for Russia in Georgia, which is exactly 
how it is perceived. Russia uses its soft power for strategic purposes in lockstep with the 
Kremlin’s post-Soviet regional agenda: to de-legitimize the role of Western institutions 
and to convince neighbors to acknowledge Russian tutelage as a “natural” form of 
protection. Instead of changing minds, it has only managed to capitalize on the Euro-
skeptic attitudes and conservative beliefs of existing constituencies. In this respect, it 
drastically differs from the Western model of soft power, which operates through 
knowledge transfer and best practices to promote widespread change.  
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